



Earlier scholarship assumed differentiated integration (DI) was pragmatic and temporary 
and that member states should and would converge on the same policies. By contrast, we 
contend that many instances of DI can be normatively justified on democratic grounds of 
fairness, impartiality and equity as suitable ways to accommodate economic, social and 
cultural heterogeneity. We distinguish between instrumental, constitutional and legislative 
differentiation and relate them respectively to problems of proportionality, partiality and 
difference. In so far as member states have unequal stakes in EU level collective decisions, 
reflecting, their economic and social heterogeneity, or apply distinct constitutional norms to 
them, reflecting their cultural heterogeneity, then fairness and impartiality in decision-
making justify respectively instrumental and constitutional DI, while the equity of regulations 
when applied to relevantly different agents and agencies warrant legislative forms of DI.  
	
1 Introduction 
Up to the mid-1990s, domestic constellations were conducive to ever-closer political 
integration. Because European integration did not extend into ‘core state powers’ (Gentschel 
and Jachtenfuchs 2016), EU affairs had low levels of political salience and national political 
elites could operate at the European level with few electoral constraints. The post-Maastricht 
period has witnessed the collapse of this ‘permissive consensus’. As integration has moved 
into core areas of state sovereignty, deeply affecting national economic, financial and welfare 
policies, public opinion has turned more Eurosceptic. Consequently, integration-friendly 
political elites now face a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
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The emergence of this ‘constraining dissensus’ correlates with the increased use of 
differentiated integration (DI) (Thym 2016), though various forms of DI have always existed 
(Schimmelfennig 2014). We define DI as EU member states having different rights and 
obligations in regard to specific EU policies, as some member states agree to cooperate on a 
specific policy or conform to a given standard, whilst others either opt out or adopt different 
standards. These forms of differentiation can be time limited or permanent, and operate inside 
or outside the treaties. By allowing states to integrate to different degrees and at different 
speeds, DI addresses a classic collective action problem, whereby a policy that is 
advantageous to most or all concerned can get blocked or rendered sub optimal, say by the 
adoption of lowest common denominator policies (Tsoukalis 2016: 199), by those who 
disagree with, feel disadvantaged by, or have less of an interest in it. The divergent views of 
member states on the general purpose and ultimate goal of the EU, and growing criticism of 
the trend towards a political union, make it increasingly difficult to achieve a consensus on 
the course EU integration should take. Instead, DI allows member states to leave their 
fundamental disagreements about the finalité of European integration unresolved by allowing 
certain members to adopt different policies to others. As such, it provides ‘one of the main 
sources of pragmatic compromise in EU politics’ (Lord 2015: 784). 
Earlier scholarship assumed that DI would erode over time (Kölliker 2001), with 
member states converging on the same policies at different speeds (Stubb 1996), rather than 
dividing permanently into ‘ins’ and ‘outs’. However, the ensuing integration process has 
disproved this expectation. Post Maastricht, DI has substantially increased. Indeed, the 
Conclusions of the European Council of 26/27 June 2014 noted that ‘the concept of ever 
closer union allows for different paths of integration for different countries’, while the leaders 
of the founding member states responded to the British leave vote by announcing an initiative 
aimed at more ‘flexible’ integration, recognizing that the ‘one-size-fits-all model simply 
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cannot work’ (Tsoukalis 2016: 199). DI even forms one of five scenarios for the future of 
Europe outlined by the Commission (2017).  
Naturally, views of DI vary. Those welcoming DI see it as a means of reconciling 
continued integration with an ever more heterogeneous membership (Lord 2015) and call for 
a pragmatic approach to EU law that accommodates the dynamics of integration and 
disintegration within the EU legal order (Dehousse 2003). In a more heterogeneous EU, a 
multispeed approach and some variable geometry may offer flexibility, allowing member 
states to choose policies more aligned to their needs and preferences (Lord 2015). Likewise, 
it might make decision-making more efficient and effective.  
Scholars who view DI less positively argue that opt-outs undermine the legal unity 
and authority of the EU (de Burca and Scott 2000; Curtin 1993), as well as the uniform 
composition of EU institutions. They fear it creates a differentiated citizenship that threatens 
the liberal model of universalist citizenship characteristic of modern constitutionalism. It 
erodes solidarity between member states and constitutes a challenge to any prospect of 
developing the EU into a political community based on shared rights and obligations of 
membership. They also fear DI weakens mutual trust between states, especially when 
accompanied by a narrative of insiders and outsiders, as is partly the case with the Eurozone 
members (Adler-Nissen 2016). Moreover, DI strengthens the power of strongly pro-
integration member states by improving their bargaining position, since negotiating beyond 
the limits of a specific policy area is more difficult for states that only participate in some of 
the relevant areas. As a result, those who opt out of certain policies lose influence in the EU, 
thereby creating different classes of citizens (Jensen and Slapin 2012).  
Existing attempts to theorise DI have mostly used the conceptual tools of traditional 
integration theories, asking whether a seemingly inverted process of integration could be 
explained by the same factors used to describe the integration process itself. Such approaches 
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are bound to be limited, not least because they fail to take into account how the increased 
heterogeneity between member states impacts both the economic space for integration and 
the political willingness to integrate further. By contrast, we shall argue that increased 
heterogeneity forms the common thread linking the various forms of DI and that it is the 
conceptual absence of heterogeneity as a defining feature of European integration which has 
prevented the emergence of a positive account of DI. Rather than seeing DI as a failure to 
integrate in a uniform way or as confining certain member states to a ‘second-class’ status 
within the EU, we hold that DI offers a tool which allows for the accommodation of 
heterogeneity and thereby the stabilisation of European integration, particularly in times of a 
severe nationalist and/or populist backlash against integration. As a result, this contribution 
focuses on the hitherto neglected normative question of which forms of DI can be said to be 
democratically justifiable. 
Democracy can be described as a fair and impartial process that treats participating 
citizens with equal concern and respect (Rawls 1993: 14; Christiano 2008). In various ways, 
fairness, impartiality and equity can all be become problematic within a heterogeneous 
political system. As will be argued below, a fair democratic process assumes that all involved 
have a roughly equal stake in any collectively made decisions, and that condition may not 
always hold in a large and complex polity. As a result, a degree of demos-shaping may be 
necessary in certain policy areas to ensure each member state has a say proportional to their 
stake (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010). Democratic impartiality involves an absence of 
substantive as well as formal bias towards, or against, particular values or groups. As such, it 
implies there must be shared criteria and a degree of solidarity among those making a 
collective decision. However, scholars of multicultural and multinational democracies note 
that among a heterogeneous people involving different cultural and national groups, 
collective decisions may reflect the cultural partiality of the dominant or majority group. 
	 5	
They suggest various forms of ‘differentiated citizenship’ may be needed to overcome this 
problem (Young 1989). Finally, equal concern and respect may involve treating a 
heterogeneous membership in different ways rather than in the same way if the oppression of 
diverse minorities is to be avoided. One rule for all may be inappropriate. Hence, one can 
expect legislation to include opt-outs and derogations. 
Adopting a demoicratic perspective, that conceives the EU as consisting of different demoi, 
we argue that just as the existence of economic and cultural heterogeneity within most of the 
member states has led many to adopt greater or lesser degrees of differentiation in policy-
making, allowing some regions and groups to opt out of certain common measures and 
occasionally adopt different ones of their own, then so must the EU. The next section 
explores how the existing literature has conceptualised and explained DI, criticising its failure 
to appreciate the EU’s heterogeneity. We distinguish between ‘instrumental’ DI, in the form 
of opt-outs or exclusions from participating in policies designed to produce collective goods 
at the EU level, be these non-excludable ‘public’ goods, or excludable ‘club’ goods; 
‘constitutional’ DI, involving an opt-out from a given policy or measure because it conflicts 
with a domestic constitutional norm or cultural practice; and ‘legislative’ DI, motivated by 
one or the other of the above reasons, where all states participate in the common measure but 
there are derogations from, or variations within, shared standards. We relate all three to 
different forms of heterogeneity: the first to economic and social heterogeneity; the second to 
cultural and constitutional heterogeneity; and the third to lesser forms of both. The third 
section argues that from a normative perspective these different forms of differentiation can 
be democratically justified in so far as they correspond respectively to the three democratic 
values of fairness, impartiality, or equity. The fourth section illustrates this argument by 




2 Heterogeneity as the driving factor of differentiated integration 
Conceptual research about DI began in the mid-1990s (Stubb 1996), leading to no less than 
30 models of DI. Since then, a variety of conceptualisations have been proposed, most of 
which can be grouped in one of three categories – time, space and policy. Conceptualisations 
focused on time are commonly linked to the idea of a ‘multi-speed Europe’, whereby some 
member states advance with integration and others are expected to follow later. Space-related 
differentiation is often associated with a ‘variable geometry’, whereby different geographic 
tiers have different levels of integration. Finally, policy-related differentiation is allied to a 
‘Europe à la carte’, where member states pick the policies they wish to join. Among these 
three models, ‘multi-speed’ would be closest to the idea of ‘ever closer’ integration, whereby 
all member states ultimately reach the same level of integration, whereas ‘Europe à la carte’ 
involves only a small number of shared competences. In both academic and political 
contexts, it is the ‘multi-speed’ concept that has dominated the debate. Overall, conceptual 
fuzziness prevails. In this paper, DI means that EU member states may have different rights 
and obligations in regard to specific EU policies, possibly only temporarily, as some member 
states agree to cooperate on a specific policy whilst others opt out or adopt different 
standards.  
Traditional integration theories have struggled to come to terms with DI (Hooghe and 
Marks 2009: 3; Jensen and Slapin 2012: 780; Kölliker 2016: 117), and so ‘have become less 
useful guides for research on the European Union’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 3). This 
difficulty arises from their neglect of different forms of heterogeneity and their implications 
for the EU. Neo-functionalism cannot explain why spill-over only occurs in certain areas but 
not in others, and why it does not affect all states equally where it occurs. Nor can it explain 
why we find DI in certain areas but not in others. Liberal intergovernmentalism cannot 
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explain why the ‘threat of alternative coalitions and exclusion’ (Moravcsik 1993: 502) by 
member states pushing for integration does not create a sufficient incentive for hesitant 
member states to join in. As for constructivist approaches, they do not explain why 
socialisation processes have not created those shared norms that would prevent some member 
states from wanting to opt out of certain policies. What these approaches share is that they 
privilege collective goods or common norms over the existing heterogeneity among member 
states. This bias rests on an implicit tendency to assume that, over time, differentiation will 
give way to uniform integration, with DI suboptimal and normatively undesirable.  
What do we mean by saying heterogeneity lies at the root of DI? Heterogeneity comes 
in two main versions. First, increasing economic and social heterogeneity means that not all 
the member states may have the same stake in given collective goods – be these goods public 
goods, such as clean air, that are non-excludable, or club goods, such as a custom union, that 
are excludable. In both cases, costs may be distributed asymmetrically and not all those 
involved may value the benefits to an equal degree. Without compulsion, there can also be 
incentives for free-riding. The deciding factor is the ratio between the advantages of reducing 
production costs by sharing them among as many members as possible, and the loss of 
benefits as the gap between average collective preferences and individual preferences widens 
(see Kölliker 2001). Therefore, the more heterogeneous the group of participating states 
becomes, the greater the likelihood that either the EU will refrain from producing a given 
collective good, leaving it to member states, or that some members states will decide to set up 
a ‘club’ that excludes others – thereby leading to differentiated integration.  
Schimmelfennig and Winzen partly captured the resulting kind of DI with the term 
‘instrumental differentiation’ which ‘is motivated by efficiency and distributional concerns’ 
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2014: 355). They contend it is by definition transitional. It 
occurs either when existing member states temporarily exclude new member states from 
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certain policy areas because they ‘fear economic and financial losses as a result of market 
integration with the new member states, the redistribution of EU funds or weak 
implementation capacity’ (ibid.: 361); or when new member states seek to be exempted 
temporarily from integration and be granted more time to adapt to EU rules and market 
pressures. In such constellations, temporary differentiation aids at least one side of the 
equation and ideally both, thereby overcoming deadlock in accession negotiations. However, 
the analysis by Schimmelfennig and Winzen is restricted to temporary forms of DI and does 
not address the increased structural economic and social heterogeneity, which implies less 
space for uniform integration overall and might lead to  some more durable forms of DI than 
the transitional ones linked to enlargement rounds. We will nonetheless use their term of 
instrumental differentiation. 
Second, heterogeneity in the values of different member states has given rise to 
constitutional differentiation. Such heterogeneity of values comes in two versions The first 
concerns policies involving cultural differences, often rooted in religious traditions, such as 
those related to marriage and divorce, abortion, the use of stem cell research or euthanasia. In 
such areas, some  governments may be reluctant to integrate a policy or seek to opt out if it is 
integrated, so as to respect the predominant cultural values of their demoi. Traditional 
integration theories do not sufficiently take into account the continuing importance of these 
identity-related forces. Legal scholars, by contrast, have noted how EU law has faced 
demands for a degree of differentiation since the 1970s so as to accommodate cultural 
diversity, leading to new concepts of differentiated citizenship (de Witte 1991).  
The second involves issues of sovereignty and diverging views about how much 
political integration is desirable. In the context of the Euro and migration crises, it has 
become clear that member states differ as to how much integration they wish to achieve, and 
of which kind. The alarming electoral successes of right-extreme parties that typically defend 
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anti-EU positions indicates how, for some citizens, the boundaries of European integration 
have been pushed too far. As a result, governments of largely Eurosceptic countries, who are 
either ideologically opposed to further integration themselves or fear domestic opposition to 
it, are either unwilling or incapable of negotiating a compromise at the EU level and instead 
seek a potentially permanent opt-out from further integration. Heterogeneity of this kind 
proves particularly salient when core state competences are transferred to the EU in the 
context of treaty revisions, and is usually associated with a discourse of ‘sovereignty’ 
(Winzen 2016).  
Finally, both socio-economic and value-heterogeneity may lead not to opt-outs from a 
collective policy or a given measure, but rather to legislative differentiation, whereby 
different regulations or standards apply to different states participating in a given common 
policy area. Currently almost 40% of EU legislation is differentiated in this way. Although 
many CJEU decisions acknowledge, often tacitly rather than explicitly, that different 
regulations and  may apply in different jurisdictions, a tension exists between the trend in EU 
law to regard non-discrimination as requiring uniform standards that apply in the same way 
everywhere, and growing claims to special rights which argue that non-discrimination within 




3 The democratic argument for differentiated integration 
The accounts of DI discussed above are essentially descriptive and analytical categories. This 
section develops a democratic rationale for DI that can legitimise some, if not all, forms of 
instrumental, constitutional and legislative DI. Democracy is standardly defended as offering 
members of a political community a legitimate mechanism for making necessary collective 
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decisions about which they may disagree by giving them an equal say (the fairness 
argument), on the basis of a common process and criteria (the impartiality argument), to 
produce decisions likely to treat those involved with equal concern and respect (the equity 
argument) (Christiano 2008). However, as we shall show below, all three arguments assume a 
degree of homogeneity among the decision-makers. A fair, impartial and equitable 
democratic system proves compatible with some forms of heterogeneity but not with others. 
To adopt the terminology of pluralist theorists of democracy, whereas horizontal, cross-
cutting cleavages promote many democratic practices; vertical, segmental cleavages, tend to 
fragment the demos and require more differentiated forms of citizenship and decision-making 
of a kind associated with theories of multiculturalism and consociationalism (Dahl 1989: chs 
16-18). These forms of democracy can be related to what in the EU context has been called 
demoi-cracy (Nicolaïdis 2013). What follows explores three classic political aphorisms 
guiding the fairness, impartiality and equity arguments for democracy respectively, noting 
how heterogeneity raises a problem for each that can justify differentiation as to which 
collective decisions may be taken, among whom and in what form.  
The first aphorism decrees ‘what touches all should be decided by all’. This aphorism 
appeals to the fairness argument but assumes a roughly equal stake in the relevant collective 
decision (Christiano 2008). On this view, if each individual is the best guardian of his or her 
interests, and the interests of every individual in the polity are equally at stake in the decision, 
then in fairness all these individuals are entitled to play an equal part in making the decision 
to ensure their interests are equally taken into account. Therefore, a democratic system based 
on one person, one vote assumes that all involved have a roughly equal stake in the overall 
package of decisions, if not in each and every one. If that was not the case and a significant 
group had less of a stake in the generality of collective decisions than most others, an equal 
vote might lead to the underfunding of public services or the rejection of public regulations 
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on which many people’s well-being depends. Consequently, a democratic case exists for 
either so shaping the demos that all those involved do have a roughly equal stake or in giving 
individuals a vote proportional to their stake, and thereby treating them fairly and with equal 
respect, if not literally equally in the sense of exactly the same (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 
2010). We shall call this the ‘proportionality problem’. 
 Demos-shaping to create an equal stake among citizens is fairly common within most 
democracies. For example, most states devolve certain public services to local communities 
for reasons of fairness as well as efficiency. States are generally heterogeneous: urban areas 
differ from rural areas, some regions have an aging population and others a higher proportion 
of children and young people, and so on. The central state may have certain regulations that 
can be reasonably regarded as in the equal interest of all, but there will be a reasonable case 
for differentiated integration in other respects. Demographic and socio-economic differences 
can all make the spending priorities of one region legitimately different to another, at least on 
those matters that impact mainly local residents. A democratic system that allowed, say, 
urban areas to determine all the policies of rural areas (or vice versa)  could be regarded as 
failing to take account of the unequal stakes citizens had in the relevant collective decisions, 
so that a disproportionate stake was given to some citizens.  
The second aphorism holds that ‘for justice to be done, it must be seen to be done’. 
This aphorism underlies the impartiality argument and the need for democracy to be not only 
fair but also publically and demonstrably so. One reason for insisting all have a fair say in 
collective decision-making rather than trusting in a benevolent dictator arises from people’s 
inevitable partiality to their own point of view. Such partiality results from the unavoidable 
limitations in our reasoning about others, particularly in large societies where the details of 
most people’s lives are a mystery to us (Christiano 2008: chs 3 and 6). Even the most 
conscientious, well intentioned and best informed of us cannot avoid drawing on our own 
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experiences and reasoning in the light of values and facts that resonate with us but may not 
do so with others. A democratic system of one person, one vote offers a formally impartial 
system that endeavours to integrate our multifarious points of view and so promote policies 
that reflect our various concerns and circumstances. Nevertheless, to do so the process must 
incorporate incentives for us – or, more realistically, the decision-makers we elect – to go 
beyond a partial perspective and ‘hear the other side’ in ways that move policy-making 
towards an impartial consideration of what is in the public interest rather than simply 
responding to the private interests of various particular groups.  
To achieve this result, the process must involve a more substantive notion of 
impartiality, whereby policy-makers address the commonly avowable interests of citizens by 
appealing to reasons that are widely shared as suitable criteria for collective decision-making 
and justifying decisions in terms of their contribution to the common good (Miller 2009; 
Christiano 2010). Two notions of a public render such an appeal possible. First, citizens must 
conceive themselves as forming a public. In part, that results from their participating in a 
scheme of social cooperation in which all have a roughly equal stake. In part, it stems from a 
shared history, culture and institutions. Second, citizens must share a sense of what count as 
public reasons, and the ability to reason in public – notions typically associated with the 
presence of a shared public sphere, involving a common language and media. Democratic 
systems that lack these public qualities are likely to allow politicians to play different groups 
off against each other. It also gives rise to the danger of consistent minorities, in which 
particular groups with distinctive cultural or other priorities are persistently excluded from 
collective decisions. These issues create what we call the ‘partiality problem’. 
Again, many member states contain cultural and national minorities and adopt various 
types of differentiation when making and applying collective policies to address this problem. 
These mechanisms standardly take the form of differentiated group rights. Following Will 
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Kymlicka, we can divide these rights into self-government rights, special representation 
rights, and poly-ethnic rights (Kymlicka 1995). All involve asymmetrical arrangements 
between regions or groups of citizens. These types of differentiation address the partiality 
problem by seeking to incorporate heterogeneous groups of citizens in a unified public 
decision-making process. Self-government rights involve the devolution of particular 
competences to certain territorially concentrated cultural or other minorities, as in Scotland or 
Catalonia; or the ability for such groups to control certain services, such as publically-funded 
faith schools that are run by particular religious groups. Special representation rights involve 
giving such groups a guaranteed level of representation to ensure their voice gets heard. 
Finally, poly-ethnic rights involve special dispensations from certain general laws for 
particular groups, such as allowing the slaughter of animals in ways that are otherwise 
prohibited to accommodate the dietary code of certain religious groups.  
The third aphorism enters here. Related to the equity argument, it dictates that 
democracy involves the ‘rule of law, not persons’. On this view, democracy ideally removes 
the possibility for arbitrary rule by preventing any person or group of persons from ruling in a 
wilful and capricious way, without consulting the interests of those subject to their rule (Pettit 
2012). Instead, they must rule by a duly constituted democratic process.  Suitably adjusted to 
take into account the proportionality and partiality problems, such a democratic process 
creates incentives to govern as equitably as possible by placing governments under the equal 
influence and control of the governed, and removable and replaceable by them, making all 
citizens rulers and ruled in turn.  
A simple account of laws that meet the equity requirement of the rule of law is that 
one should have ‘one law for all’. Yet, this simple account turns out to be simplistic. Most 
people accept that exceptions can exist – for example, that ambulances may exceed speed 
limits when rushing a sick person to hospital, even if we expect them to exercise due care and 
	 14	
attention when doing so. Likewise, it seems reasonable to look at the heterogeneity of 
different types of provider of a given service when setting and applying regulatory standards. 
So certain health and safety rules may differ with regard to small and large firms. Similarly, 
there can be rules designed to benefit specific groups of people, albeit in the interests of 
equity, such as regulations aimed at facilitating access to buildings for the disabled. As a 
result, a more accurate principle of equity in the case of laws would be the Aristotelian 
maxim that ‘one treats like cases alike, and unalike cases differently’. Yet, a difficulty arises 
in deciding when a difference is relevant or not with regard to the policy at hand. We call this 
the ‘difference problem’. A well-designed democratic system responds to this problem by 
allowing different groups within society to ‘hear the other side’ and share the costs and 
benefits of differential treatment reciprocally (Bellamy 2007: 80-83). However, this process 
will only operate in a fair and impartial manner that respects difference to the extent the 
proportionality and partiality problems are taken into account. 
Democratic decision-making about common policies can only be fair, impartial and 
equitable to the extent it takes into account the proportionality, partiality and difference 
problems, which can all arise within heterogeneous states. Such heterogeneity creates 
different demoi, making it necessary to conceive how these different groups can govern 
together but not as one (Nicolaïdis 2013). Applying the argument to the EU, the next section 
argues that the proportionality problem can justify excluding, temporarily or permanently, 
some member states from participation in certain club goods. It proves less legitimate with 
public goods, where they cannot be excluded from the negative or positive externalities they 
produce. Fair-play arguments of political obligation suggest in such cases, all should 
contribute (Rawls 1964). However, unless such goods relate to upholding basic rights, it 
would be illegitimate to force people into accepting benefits they do not value (Nozick 1974: 
90-95). At some point, all the member states would need to be involved in deciding whether 
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and how far such goods should be provided. The partiality problem enters here, since this 
allows for those who conceive of themselves as a distinct public with divergent public norms 
to make their own decisions as to what collective goods they should support in circumstances 
where they feel their distinct but reasonable views will not get an impartial hearing. Finally, 
the difference problem suggests that when groups with different interests and values belong 
to a club, then collective rules need to accommodate these differences to some degree. Figure 
1 summarises the argument so far, indicating how we will relate these three arguments 
respectively to instrumental, constitutional and legislative differentiation in section 4.  
Figure 1 
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4 Instrumental, constitutional and legislative differentiation 
As the EU slogan ‘unity in diversity’ indicates, the EU recognises the proportionality, 
partiality and difference problems to some degree, not least in the demoicratic character of 
many of its governance structures (Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). So far as the treaty-
making and accession processes are concerned, the EU remains a union of member states and 
their peoples rather than straightforwardly of European citizens. This feature has allowed the 
proportionality, partiality and difference problems to be partly accommodated through 
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temporary exclusions, opt-outs and differentiated legislation. The emphasis on subsidiarity 
and the use of national parliaments to police it also reflects an awareness of these problems 
(Kröger and Bellamy 2016). Issues better regulated at the European than at lower levels are 
likely to be those where member states possess an equal stake and a shared perspective. 
Where they have different stakes, subsidiarity operates in a similar manner to the devolution 
of many services to local government even within unitary states. Where cultural differences 
exist, subsidiarity operates similarly to granting self-government rights to different linguistic 
and other cultural communities within multinational and multicultural federal systems, which 
can extend to different legal, health and education systems and include extensive tax raising 
powers. As in many domestic systems, countries have also requested Treaty opt-outs that lead 
to an asymmetric retention of power by certain member states in matters that most countries 
agree can be EU competences. Thus, Denmark and the UK have four Treaty opt-outs each, 
Ireland two and Poland one. Meanwhile, much EU legislation is increasingly differentiated so 
as to apply differently in different member states. Below, we explore the case for such opt-
outs on grounds of fairness, impartiality and equity in the context of a heterogeneous EU. 
With regarded to fairness, we noted above how economic and social heterogeneity 
can be problematic in the case of collective goods. Even when all countries have an equal 
stake in a common measure, they may not have equal incentives to resource it. However, 
differences in population size, varieties of capitalism, economic specialisation and wealth 
may lead to different stakes, giving rise to the proportionality problem. Giandomenico 
Majone has observed how the logic of collective action often militates against the optimal 
provision of a collective good, particularly among a large and heterogeneous group (Majone 
2016). If all members benefit from a collective good because it is a public good or 
membership of the club producing it is automatic, they will have an incentive to free-ride on 
the efforts of others and to contribute less than their fair share to its provision. In a small 
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group, wealthier participants may be willing to cover more than their fair share, accepting 
that they gain more from the good and would suffer a greater loss from its not being supplied 
than in paying disproportionally to provide it. Selective incentives can also be offered to 
encourage compliance. For instance, the Common Agricultural Policy originated as part of a 
grand bargain between France and Germany to gain French support for further European 
integration in other areas. As the club gets bigger, such trade-offs get harder to arrange, 
especially if the balance between wealthier and poorer countries tips decisively towards the 
latter, as has happened post Eastern enlargement whereby Denmark has a GDP/capita that is 
7.5 times that of Bulgaria (Eurostat GDP/capita 2016). The poorer and/or smaller states will 
tend to exploit the wealthier and/or larger states. Clubs with a larger membership that possess 
such asymmetries are also more likely to include members for whom the costs outweigh the 
benefits associated with the good. There are also likely to be disagreements as to which 
collective goods should be provided in the first place, increasing the transaction costs of 
obtaining consensual agreement among all concerned.  
In these circumstances, it becomes rational to employ instrumental forms of DI that 
reduce the club involved in producing a given collective good to a smaller group than the 
whole so as to overcome the proportionality problem. Two mechanisms have been employed 
to achieve this result. One approach, suggested as early as 1975 in the ‘Leo Tindemans 
Report’, involves allowing a small, ‘pioneer’, group to forge ahead with cooperation in a 
given policy (Piris 2012: 67). However, since Amsterdam the Treaties have authorised both 
‘in-built’ cooperation for certain members in policy areas specifically mentioned in the 
Treaties, such as the Schengen and Euro areas, and allowed certain members to employ EU 
institutions for  ‘enhanced cooperation’ on a case by case basis should at least nine member 
states wish to do so (Piris 2012: 70-75). A corollary of such measures has been to exclude 
those states that fail to reach a given threshold sufficient to make them fair participants in a 
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particular club good, although hitherto such exclusions have been seen as temporary. The 
most significant example of this approach is participation in the Euro, which depends on the 
fulfilment of certain pre-conditions, although arguably these criteria have proved neither 
stringent enough nor been applied with appropriate rigour. Likewise, the exclusion of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia from the Schengen Area might be justified on the grounds 
that they had a disproportionate interest in free movement in order to access better jobs in 
other member states. However, an injustice might be thought to be committed where the stake 
an excluded country has in a collective arrangement is greater than those that are included. 
For example, in the case of free movement the potential costs to existing member states of an 
influx of cheap labour could be said to be less than the benefit to the new member states 
when such temporary arrangements were introduced, so that the latter were unfairly treated in 
having their interests weighed equally with those of the former. 
A second approach to the proportionality problem involves taking subsidiarity seriously and 
accepting that different functional tasks may be assigned to a wide variety of different levels 
involving different groups of states and even of regions not only for reasons of efficiency but 
also to reflect the degree of interest each of the participants has in it. Such a solution would 
extend the EU’s variable geometry, yet no more than is common within many unitary 
federations that allow the asymmetrical devolution of various competences to different 
regions. Again, a Treaty basis already exists for such flexibility (Piris 2012: 75-77). Protocol 
25 on the exercise of shared competences makes explicit that even in areas where the EU has 
adopted legislation, member states can legislate nationally and conclude agreements with 
other states in those areas not specifically governed by the relevant EU act. Indeed, since the 
1980s the Commission has limited many measures to ‘minimum’ or ‘partial’ harmonisation. 
Article 100A(4) of the Single European Act even introduced the possibility of a partial opt-
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out from a given harmonisation if ‘a member state deems it necessary to apply national 
provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36’. 
 Public goods raise a potential problem for DI through being non-excludable. 
Consequently, they generate positive externalities from which non-club members still benefit 
or negative externalities that disadvantage them further. However, EU policies with this 
property are exceptions not the norm. Not even all environmental policies tackle EU wide 
public goods or bads. Negative or positive externalities cannot provide a justification for a 
common policy on beach cleanliness, for example. Here, the advantages or disadvantages 
accrue largely to local residents and so can be differentiated. 
Likewise, since Maastricht, the Treaties have recognised the possibility of 
constitutional differentiation to address the partiality problem. For example, Article 3 TEU 
asserts the Union ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity’, Article 67 (1) TFEU 
that it will ‘respect … the different legal systems and traditions of the member states’ and 
Article 4 (2) TEU that it ‘respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government.’ More specifically, Articles 83 (3) and 151 
TFEU assert that relevant Union measures must respect national practices in the operation of 
the criminal justice system and social policy. These and similar articles reflect tensions from 
the 1970s onwards between national constitutional courts and certain rulings of the Court of 
Justice regarding areas where the former held domestic constitutional norms legitimated 
restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour that the latter sought 
to uphold. This conflict was at the heart of a whole series of key cases where the Court of 
Justice was criticised for extending the range of its jurisdiction and interpreting rights in a 
largely market manner that showed scant respect for national constitutional values: notably, 
Cinéthèque, Groener, Bond, ERT and Grogen (De Witte 1991, Coppel and O'Neill 1992). 
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Such issues have played an important role in a number of key opt-outs, such as the Danish 
Protocol allowing a permanent derogation prohibiting the purchase of second homes by non-
Danes and regarding its non-participation in the European Policy on Defence and Security, or 
the Irish Protocol on Article 40.3.3 concerning the prohibition of abortion. Denmark and the 
United Kingdom also have opt-outs from certain central EU policies relating to the free 
movement of persons and the Euro, on the grounds that these are core powers of sovereignty. 
Calls for such opt outs have spread to other countries due to the pressure to share the burden 
of refugees in the wake of the migrant crisis and to introduce constitutional measures 
regarding public spending following the Euro crisis.  
The rationale behind the insistence on constitutional differentiation lies in the fact that 
the different demoi of the member states have already developed their own constitutional and 
juridical orders that reflect the distinctive and diverse public cultures of their citizens. As a 
result, impartiality in the application of constitutional norms may not be possible at the EU 
level.  Even if all the member states endorse broadly the same set of rights and democratic 
principles, they may have legitimately different views about their scope and relative 
weighting with regard to both each other and other important values and interests that reflect 
valid cultural differences. The right to freedom of expression is accepted by all member 
states, for example, but in certain countries it is interpreted as warranting the special 
protection of linguistic minorities or a national language on the grounds that a people's 
culture provides the necessary context within which they express themselves as possessors of 
a specific identity. Such reasoning led the German Federal Court to affirm in its 2009 Lisbon 
Judgment that European unification should ‘not be achieved in such a way that not sufficient 
space is left to the member states for the political formation of economic, cultural and social 
living conditions.’ 
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Nevertheless, basic rights if not EU law can limit how much constitutional 
differentiation is justifiable. The Polish stance on homosexuality, for example, is problematic 
in itself, not just because it can restrict mobility and non-discrimination in the EU. Likewise, 
the degree to which Hungary and Poland are currently adhering to the principle of democracy 
and the rule of law, and hence should be allowed full membership of the EU, has become 
increasingly debateable for a number of commentators (Kelemen 2017). 
Of course, constitutional opt-outs are the exception rather than the rule. However, we 
noted how 40% of EU legislation involves derogations and differences among member states 
in applying a given measure. During the 1960s and 70s, European institutions took the view 
expressed in the landmark Costa judgment that the ‘executive force of Community law 
cannot vary from one state to another … without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives 
of the treaty’. However, as the membership has grown and become more varied, so the 
formulation of specific EU secondary law has allowed for flexibility that acknowledges the 
need on grounds of equity to recognise relevant differences. This need involves both 
economic and social differences involving the proportionality problem and constitutional 
differences involving the partiality problem. For example, with regard to the proportionality 
problem, although Transport Minister Chris Grayling declared that as a result of Brexit the 
UK would now be able to set the height of its own railway platforms, the relevant EU 
regulation (EU) No 1299/2014, allows considerable diversity to accommodate the 
extraordinary variety of gauges and heights currently present across Europe. The 
interoperability of trains across Europe is an important collective good, but not at a cost that 
would undermine the likely benefits. Similarly, with regard to the partiality problem, the, 
Commission has proposed amending Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 to give member states 
decisional power regarding the use on their territory of genetically modified food or feed that 




We have argued that traditional European integration theories are ill-equipped to address the 
demands for DI because they ignore both how social and economic heterogeneity may render 
some collective goods inefficient and inequitable for all member states, and the cultural 
heterogeneity underlying sovereignty and identity-based claims. To address these 
shortcomings, we have proposed a democratic rationale for different categories of DI. Such 
an approach focuses on criteria that can render differentiation democratically legitimate. 
Democracy provides a fair and impartial process for the legitimate making of equitable 
collective decisions. However, the suitability of such a process assumes that all citizens have 
an equal stake in the collective decision and conceive themselves as a public capable of 
arguing from a shared set of public reasons. We have argued that to the degree groups of 
citizens are heterogeneous and have unequal stakes in a collective decision then one can 
expect instrumental differentiation, which reflects the proportionate degree of interest given 
groups may have in any policy. Likewise, to the extent groups have heterogeneous public 
cultures and feel they belong to distinct demoi, then collective decision-making risks not 
being impartial thereby justifying differentiated group rights that will lead to an asymmetric 
distribution of self-government between different member states and a number of exemptions 
typical of constitutional differentiation. Both types of heterogeneity will also produce 
legislative differentiation even when all adopt common policies. 
 None of this should be surprising. States with significant national minorities have 
often adopted forms of consociational governance that involve elements of proportionality 
and partiality. In collective decision-making the various groups are represented separately in 
ways that give them a proportionate say or protect them from partial views, with considerable 
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devolution of decisions to the relevant regions, often to different degrees and in different 
policy areas. Such states also have a considerable amount of differentiated legislation, 
granting special rights to different groups. A number of analysts (Costa and Magnette 2003; 
Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010) have noted the consociational features of current EU 
decision-making arrangements, and these can be expected to increase to the extent the 
heterogeneity between member states increases.  
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